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ABSTRACT. In this paper I take into account some irregularities concerning the 
distribution of so called ∀-readings and ∃-readings on the set of relative clause donkey-
sentences. Dynamic semantics is assumed to provide the correct analysis of donkey 
dependencies. I defend a theory of the distributional facts based on a notion of dynamic 
monotonicity, and introduce for this end an algorithmic form of quantifier domain 
restriction, whose representation at LF provides a key to explain away counter-
examples. No ambiguity is introduced in the semantics either of pronouns, or of 
quantificational determiners. 
 
1 The problem 
 
Commonly held semantic judgments concerning truth-conditions of some 
donkey-sentences pose a serious challenge to any theory of donkey-anaphora in 
which uniform semantic representations are construed for such sentences. Take 
the following representative pair: 
(1) Every person who has a credit card pays a heavy charge for it. 
(1') ∀x[(person(x)∧∃y(c-card(y)∧have(x,y))) → ∀y((c-card(y)∧have(x,y)) → 
pay-charge-for(x,y))] 
(2) Every person who has a credit card pays the bill with it. 
(2') ∀x[(person(x)∧∃y(c-card(y)∧have(x,y)))→∃y(c-card(y)∧have(x,y)∧pay-
with(x,y))] 
According to intuition, (1) shows a preference for a ∀-reading, formally 
expressed in (1'), whereas (2) seems to require an ∃-reading construal, given in 
(2'). The latter sentence is problematic for every classical approach to donkey-
anaphora: Kamp’s DRT (1981) and Groenendijk&Stokhof’s DPL (1991), on the 
dynamic side, as well as the variants of the e-type approach proposed by Heim 
(1990) and Neale (1990), on the static side, would all indeed converge in 
predicting a ∀-reading for both (1) and (2). All these approaches lack a formally 
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implemented explanation of how ∃-readings of sentences with ‘every’ come 
about.1
In the case at hand, the logical formulas hypothetically assumed as adequate 
semantic representations are not isomorphic, in spite of the structural similarity 
between the two sentences. The question thus arises, whether a uniform semantic 
representation of (1) and (2) is conceivable, which has the potentiality of 
accommodating both readings (1') and (2'). More generally, we are faced with the 
question whether a principled explanation of how the two readings are distributed 
can be provided. Hereafter, I will speak of ‘distribution’ simpliciter, meaning the 
distribution of ∀/∃-readings on the set of donkey-sentences.  
2 A monotonicity-based theory of distribution 
 
I assume here that dynamic semantics provides the correct approach to the 
analysis of donkey sentences; I stick further to a theory of distribution based on 
extension of monotonicity to dynamic contexts2. According to Kanazawa (1994), 
the distributional phenomena should be expected to correlate with monotonicity 
patterns of determiners. In general, whether a donkey-sentence [detδ][N'γ][VPχ] has 
a ∀-reading or an ∃-reading is relevant for the quantifier which interprets [detδ] to 
preserve the usual monotonicity behaviour of the determiner itself. Take for 
instance (3), which has intuitively a ∀-reading. If one accepts Kanazawa’s 
theory, one has principled reasons to expect that (3) should have such a reading. 
Roughly, his argument runs as follows: suppose (3) had the ∃-reading; as a 
consequence, the downward monotonicity inference from (3) to (3c), which is 
intuitively felt to hold, could not be valid: 
(3) Every man who has a son loves him. 
(3b) Every man who has a teen-age son is a man who has a son. 
(3c) Every man who has a teen-age son loves him. 
Suppose that in the discourse domain there be a man x who has just two sons 
y, z :  y is a teen-ager,  z is six years old, and x loves only z. In a situation so 
characterized, fixed an ∃-reading construal for both (3) and (3c), (3) could be 
true, but (3c) could not; but if we assume that the base generated reading for a 
sentence with ‘every’ is the universal one, we are in a position to explain the 
validity of a monotonicity inference like the one exemplified by (3)-(3c): under 
such an assumption, we could not have anymore the premiss true and the 
conclusion false, since x would be a counter-instance for (3) too. 
                                                 
1 The extended e-type approach put forward by Lappin&Francez (1994) can indeed cope with these 
data; but it seems to me that it gains empirical adequacy at the price of positing a semantic 
ambiguity in donkey-pronouns, whose representations at LF happen to involve semantically 
different types of functions (maximal functions vs. choice functions). 
2 See Kanazawa (1993, 1994). 
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The simple example I have thus given shows that there are important reasons 
for expecting that sentences with ‘every’ have the ∀-reading, and more generally 
that the distributional phenomena be not random, but conform to an ideal pattern 
correlating with the exact distribution of monotonicity properties on the set of 
quantificational determiners. These reasons concern preservation of a particular 
semantic structure in the transition from simple (non-donkey) quantificational 
contexts to quantified sentences with donkey-anaphora. The interesting point is 
that semantic properties of quantifiers such as monotonicity have been assuming 
a central role in contemporary semantic theory, so that the requirement that these 
properties hold of quantifiers even when they occur in donkey-contexts appears 
as perfectly natural and coherent with current assumptions concerning the role of 
so-called semantic universals. However, an objection against the possibility of 
extending the concept of monotonicity to donkey-sentences (hence to a concept 
of dynamic monotonicity) may come from consideration of the following invalid 
syllogism3: 
(A) Every man who has a house is a man who has a garden. 
(B) Every man who has a garden sprinkles it on Sundays. 
(C) So(???), every man who has a house sprinkles it on Sundays. 
Dynamic semantics allows one to explain the inferential failure in (A)-(C) in a 
natural, non-ad hoc way, without giving up the idea that determiners maintain 
their usual monotonicity behaviour in donkey-contexts. The reason of the failure 
is that the premiss (A) expresses a simple inclusion between the set of house-
owners and the set of garden-owners, the latter being the static denotation of 
(B)’s N'-restriction ‘man who owns a garden’, whereas a proper semantic 
analysis of (B) would require to take into account the anaphoric potential of such 
constituent, hence its dynamic denotation. To put it in an informal way, one can 
say that in (B) the N'-restriction on ‘every’ sets up pairs of referents <x, y>, such 
that x is a man and y is a garden that x has, whereas each of such pairs is relevant 
for the evaluation of the VP. Hence, for the purpose of drawing (left) 
monotonicity inferences from donkey-sentences, one should consider inclusions 
between given sets of pairs of this kind. In what follows, I will provide a 
formalization of left dynamic monotonicity principles, hence a more precise 
characterization of the condition thus informally expressed. 
3 The Monotonicity Principle in a dynamic setting 
Following Kanazawa (1994), I assume a meta-semantic principle whose 
function is that of regulating the distribution of the two readings on the pure 
semantic ground represented by monotonicity of quantificational determiners. To 
formulate the principle in a semi-formal manner, we need firstly to introduce 
                                                 
3 This syllogism is due to van Benthem. 
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some logical notation. In our language we want symbols for both static and 
dynamic generalized quantifiers. We will use dynamic generalized quantifiers to 
model donkey-sentences, so as to represent donkey-dependencies as binding 
relations. The main characteristics of a DGQ is indeed that of allowing variables 
occurring free in its right argument to be bound to existential quantifiers in its left 
argument. For each SGQ Q, our dynamic logic has a corresponding DGQ Q; to 
say that Q corresponds to Q as its dynamic counterpart means that Qx{Φ}{Ψ} 
and Qx{Φ}{Ψ} get the same truth-conditions when Ψ does not contain free 
occurrences of a variable which is accessible to existential quantifiers in Φ. 
Logical signs comprehend static and dynamic connectives: on the static side, we 
have the usual connectives ¬, ∧, →,…, with their usual interpretations; amongst 
dynamic connectives we have ; and ⇒ for dynamic conjunction and dynamic 
implication respectively. Dynamic existential quantifier is symbolized as E.  
Definitions of ; , ⇒ and E are as in Groenendijk&Stokhof (1991); given the 
relevance of these logical operators in modeling donkey sentences, I report below 
their semantic clauses, besides the one for the meta-connective ≤, which is put 
for dynamic meaning inclusion and play a crucial role in the formalization of left 
dynamic monotonicity: 
(a) [[Exϕ]] = {<g,h>: ∃k k[x]g & <k,h>∈[[ϕ]] } 
(b) [[ϕ;ψ]] = {<g,h>: ∃k <g,k>∈[[ϕ]] & <k,h>∈[[ψ]]} 
(c) [[ϕ⇒ψ]] = {<g,h>: h=g & ∀k <g,k>∈[[ϕ]] → ∃m<k,m>∈[[ψ]]} 
(d) [[ϕ≤ψ]]={<g,h>: g=h & ∀s <g,s>∈[[ϕ]] ⇒ <g,s>∈[[ψ]]} 
The combined effect of (a)-(c) is that the following (static) equivalences hold: 
(Exϕ)⇒ψ ≡ ∀x(ϕ⇒ψ) 
 whether x doesn’t occur free in ψ or not  
   (Exϕ);ψ ≡ Ex(ϕ;ψ) 
As a purely language-internal matter, one finds the question of how to define 
the semantics of a DGQ Q so as to create the possibility of indirect binding 
relations between its two arguments. There are a lot of definitional options from a 
technical point of view, but having to express either ∀-readings or ∃-readings, we 
can restrict ourselves to two possibilities: 
(Def.1) Qx{Φ}{Ψ} =def Qx{Φ}{Φ⇒Ψ} 
(Def.2) Qx{Φ}{Ψ} =def Qx{Φ}{Φ;Ψ} 
Assuming definition (Def.1) for DGQs, we are able to represent the ∀-reading 
of (1) by means of the following logical structure: 
 (1°) EVERY x {person(x) ; Ey c-card(y) ; have(x,y)}{pay-charge-for(x,y)} 
 ≡ EVERY x {person(x) ∧ ∃y(c-card(y) ∧ have(x,y))} {∀y((c-card(y) ∧ 
have(x,y)) → pay-charge-for(x,y))} 
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If we opt to define DGQs as in (Def.2), we can model a sentence like (2) so as 
to represent its apparent ∃-reading. The linguistic structure is the same as in the 
preceding case, but it will have structurally different semantic aspects: 
(2°) EVERY  x{person(x) ; Ey credit-card(y) ; have(x,y)}{pay-with(x,y)} 
≡ EVERY x {person(x) ∧ ∃y(c-card(y) ∧ have(x,y))}{∃y((c-card(y) ∧ 
have(x,y) ∧ pay-with(x,y))} 
General availability of the two kinds of reading imposes the following 
condition: for our logical system to be materially adequate, it must contain both 
types of DGQs. Indeed, given the apparent availability of both reading-types for 
sentences with equi-monotone determiners, one may be induced to admit, for 
each static quantifier Q, two dynamic counterparts: Q∀ (introduced through 
(Def.1)) and Q∃ (introduced through (Def.2)). But this would reduce to introduce 
a lexical ambiguity in every determiner. In particular, one would have two 
different dynamic interpretations for the same item ‘every’, only one of which 
(namely EVERY∀) would match with the familiar quantifier EVERY with respect 
to monotonicity (this point has been established in discussing the inference from 
(3) to (3c); for the inference to go through, the reading of the premiss must be the 
universal one, what comes down to the claim that only EVERY∀ preserves the 
familiar monotonicity properties of EVERY). 
We are now in a position to formulate the meta-semantic principle which we 
want to take as a rule governing the distribution of the two reading-types. We 
state first the dynamic monotonicity principles (DMP1) and (DMP2), as well as 
the semantic fact (F) and the definition (D): 
(DMP1) Q is ↓DMON  iff   Φ′ ≤ Φ  &  Q x {Φ}{Ψ}╞  Q x {Φ′}{Ψ} 
(DMP2) Q is ↑DMON  iff   Φ ≤ Φ′  &  Q x {Φ}{Ψ}╞  Q x {Φ′}{Ψ}4
(F) Given a SGQ Q which is left monotone and right monotone in either 
direction, just one of the two DGQs Q∀, Q∃, which can be defined on the 
basis of Q, preserves the full monotonicity pattern of Q 
(D) ‘Q is monotonically congruent with Q’ ≡ ‘Q preserves the full mp of Q’ 
MONOTONICITY PRINCIPLE (MP) 
Be Q∀ (Q∃) the DGQ monotonically congruent with Q: it is stipulated that Q∀ 
(Q∃) is the only dynamic counterpart of Q allowed to enter semantic computation 
for a donkey-sentence [δ N' VP] whose main determiner δ is conventionally 
mapped onto Q. 
This formulation corresponds very closely to the one given by Kanazawa 
(1994), but I state the principle more explicitly as a choice-criterion. 
                                                 
4 The labels ↓DMON and ↑DMON are to be taken as abbreviations for ‘dynamically downward 
monotone on the left’ and ‘dynamically upward monotone on the left’, respectively. 
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4 Quantifier Domain Restriction as a way out from 
anomalies 
In virtue of its simplicity and principled character, the monotonicity-based 
theory meets empirical difficulties. If the instance of preserving monotonicity 
inferences is taken seriously, one has to provide an explanation of distributional 
anomalies such as one can find in sentences like (2). The explanation I propose is 
based on the hypothesis that a certain form of quantifier domain restriction 
(QDR) has come into play in the transition from the base-generated meaning of α 
to the output of α’s interpretation in context (where α is whatever sentence for 
which an unexpected reading has been observed). Following Stanley and Szabó 
(2000), I assume that quantified sentences (including the donkey cases) are 
mapped onto LFs characterized by free domain variables of the form ‘f(x)’ (‘f’ 
and ‘x’ being variables of type <e,<e,t>> and e, respectively), and show that, 
given special assumptions on the binding of ‘x’ and on the evaluation of ‘f’, the 
deviant readings can be represented within the dynamic framework referred to 
above, without positing any change in the type of the DGQs involved. For the 
purpose of introducing my proposal in an informal way, let me focus on sentence 
(2): 
(2) Every person who has a credit card pays the bill with it. 
The most salient reading of this sentence is paraphrasable as ‘every person 
having a credit card uses one credit card she has to pay the bill’. My idea is that 
we are disposed to accept such a paraphrase because of our world knowledge, 
which excludes as a rule the fact of a person paying a single bill with more than 
one card. An utterance-context for (2) is thus supposed to include the assumption 
(call it A) that a person pays a given bill with at most one credit card, whereas A 
must be thought as something having the status of a presupposition publicly 
accessible; it is properly A’s public accessibility what determines a hearer to 
interpret (2) as stating something about no more than one object of the relevant 
kind. The intuition underlying my proposal is that A interacts with the structural 
elements in (2)’s LF, and that such interaction takes the form of a domain 
restriction accomplished through accommodation of the content of A. 
I proceed now to show how the explanatory proposal thus illustrated can be 
formally implemented. Consider firstly the following rough LF for (2): 
(2LF) EVERY x {person(x) ∧ ∃y(c-card(y) ∧ have(x,y))} {∃!y(c-card(y) ∧ 
have(x,y) ∧ pay-with(x,y))} 
(2LF) represents the intuitively right reading of (2), but it seems completely 
unrelated with the LF one would obtain if one used the DGQ EVERY∀. Anyhow, 
if we take into account the accommodation of presupposition A referred to 
above, and further conceptualize the process at issue as one of QDR, we shall be 
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in a position to capture the apparent ∃-reading of (2) within the DGQ-analysis 
that MP sanctions. A natural way of accomplishing accommodation of the 
referred presupposition at the level of the restriction ‘person who had a credit 
card’, is as follows: in the underlying logical structure of such N', two variables 
x, y, are introduced; given that x is fixed to be a person and y a credit card owned 
by x, presupposition A may be accommodated by supposing that x does not pay 
her bill with any of her possibly multiple credit cards z, where z is distinct from 
the card y previously introduced; this latter condition comes down to the proviso 
that x pays her bill with no more than one credit card. A sentence we may think 
to be derivable from (2) via a process of accommodation taking the form above 
indicated is (2*), given along with the standard DGQ-analysis:5
(2*) Every person who has [a credit card]i and who doesn’t pay the bill with 
[any [other]i of her credit cards] j pays the bill with [it]i. 
(2*LF) person(x) 
EVERY∀ x Ey card(y) ; have(x,y) {pay(x,y)} 
 ∀z((card(z) ; have(x,z) ; z≠y)⇒¬pay(x,z)) 
As can be easily checked, (2*) has a ∀-reading, represented in (2*LF) 
(whatever may be the credit card y introduced by the indefinite NP, it is true that 
the owner of y pays her bill with y, if she doesn’t use any other of her cards). 
(2*LF) can be claimed to bear a particular relation of equivalence to the naïve LF 
(2LF): let’s call it pragmatic equivalence, to distinguish it from strict semantic 
equivalence. The two logical structures cannot be said to be semantically 
equivalent in a strict sense, (2LF) being about persons having credit cards, while 
(2*LF) being about persons having credit cards and using at most one to pay their 
bills. Nonetheless, I say they are pragmatically equivalent, because of a 
background assumption according to which any person pays a single bill with at 
most one credit card: because of this assumption, (2LF) can be seen as 
pragmatically restricted to persons who pays with at most one credit card, when 
they pay at all). Given the pragmatic equivalence between (2*LF) and (2LF), the 
former, as well as the latter, can be assumed to fix (2)’s semantic content (with 
respect to a context characterized as containing presupposition A). I propose to 
take the former as an LF-representation of (2), modulo QDR. What we gain if we 
accept this option is to keep our LF-analysis consistent with MP. 
Consider now sentence (4), which is another problematic case for the 
monotonicity-based account. 
(4) No person who has an umbrella leaves it home on a day like this. 
                                                 
5  In the structural description and in the logical formulas I underline the adjoined predicate, in 
order to mean that it is contextually integrated; I also give the relevant LFs in a non-linear notation, 
for the sake of perspicuity; in such a notation, the lines in the restrictive part of a DPL-formula are 
to be intended as (dynamically) conjoined in the top-down order. 
 7
(4LF) NO x {person(x) ∧ ∃y[umbrella(y) ∧ have(x,y)]} {∀y[(umbrella(y) ∧ 
have(x,y)) → leave'(x,y)]} 
(4) seems to require the ∀-reading construal specified above, in spite of the 
initial determiner ‘no’. Nonetheless, it is straightforward to show that the same 
QDR-based strategy applied to (2) allows us to represent the intuitive reading of 
(4) by means of the DGQ NO∃. In the present case, we focus on the existence of a 
presupposition to the effect that a person takes at most one umbrella with her on 
a rainy day. The presupposition gets accommodated via QDR in the following 
way: given that in the restrictive part of the main quantifier x is fixed to be a 
person and y an umbrella owned by x, the referred presupposition may be 
integrated by supposing that x leaves z home, where z is any of x’s umbrellas 
distinct from the umbrella y previously introduced. 
(4*) No person who has [an umbrella]i and who leaves [each [other]i of her 
umbrellas]j home, leaves [it]i home on a day like this. 
(4*LF) person(x) 
NO∃ x Ey umbrella(y) ; have(x,y) {leave'(x,y)} 
 ∀z((umbrella(z) ; have(x,z) ; z≠y)⇒ leave'(x,z)) 
An ∃-reading construal for (4*) is materially adequate; indeed, the LF-
representation (4*LF) expresses its intuitive reading, and since it is pragmatically-
equivalent to (4LF) – under the background assumption that any man takes at 
most one umbrella with him when going out –, it can be used to fix the truth-
conditions of (4). As for the preceding case, I propose to assign (4*LF) to (4) as a 
possible LF-representation, modulo QDR. The interesting thing in this 
connection is that (4*LF) is construed with the DGQ NO∃, which is the dynamic 
counterpart of NO, according to MP. 
In the QDR-based analyses given thus far, I have been presupposing that (2) 
and (4) share an interpretational property, which can be highlighted by rephrasing 
the latter as an every-sentence, along the lines indicated below: 
(2)    Every person who has a credit card pays the bill with it. 
(2LF) EVERY x {person(x) ∧ ∃y[c-card(y) ∧ have(x,y)]} {∃!y[c-card(y) ∧ 
have(x,y) ∧ pay'(x,y)]} 
(4)    Every person who has an umbrella takes it with her on a day like this. 
(4LF) EVERY x {person(x) ∧ ∃y[umbrella(y) ∧ have(x,y)]} 
{∃!y[umbrella(y)∧have(x,y)∧take'(x,y)]} 
The rough LFs (2LF) and (4LF) ascribe to the meaning of both sentences a 
‘uniqueness feature’ (every individual in the domain bears a given relation to a 
unique object of a given kind). I have assumed that the existence of such 
interpretive feature depends on speakers’ world-knowledge (normally, a person 
pays the bill with at most one credit card, and takes at most one umbrella with 
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her when she goes out on a rainy day; that’s all). The complex predicates that I 
have supposed to be contextually integrated in the restrictions capture indeed the 
uniqueness feature, in virtue of their common logical structure (no individual in 
the locally determined domain D can bear the pertinent relation R to more than 
one object of the relevant kind X, since a contextual, non-local factor introduces 
a priori the constraint: ceteris paribus, an individual in D bears R to no more 
than one object X). The structure of those complex predicates can be expressed 
by means of the meta-formula (DR), where ‘φ’ stays for the N'-restriction of the 
antecedent indefinite NP, ‘ψ’ for the transitive verb of the antecedent containing 
clause, and ‘χ’ may stay alternatively either for the verb V of the main clause or 
for its negation ¬V. 
(DR) ∀z((φ(z);ψ(x,z);z≠y)⇒χ(x,z)) 
 But if we applied (DR) as a rule whenever we found a sentence preferring the 
unexpected reading, we would meet some difficulties. Take an every-sentence 
with a surface ∃-reading, but lacking uniqueness implicatures of the sort 
considered above; (5), given along with the naïve representation (5LF), is a case in 
point: 
(5) Every person who had a dime put it in the parking meter. 
(5LF) EVERY x {person(x) ∧ ∃y[dime(y) ∧ have(x,y)]} {∃y[dime(y) ∧ 
have(x,y) ∧ put'(x,y)]} 
If we derived now a sentence like (5*), through mechanical application of 
(DR) to (5), we would get an unlikely result: 
(5*) Every person who had [a dime]i and did not put [any [other]i of his dimes]j 
in the parking meter put [it]i in the parking meter. 
The problem is that there seems to be no background assumption according to 
which any person puts at most one dime into the parking meter on a given 
occasion. For this reason, a restriction like the one articulated in (5*), obtained by 
means of the rule (DR), results to be too strong, having the effect of narrowing 
down the quantifier domain too dramatically. This effect reduces to weakening 
the truth-conditions of the original sentence. Nonetheless, it would be very 
strange if the ∃-reading of (5) had nothing to do with a QDR-effect. After all, it 
seems plausible to assume the existence of a background assumption concerning 
normal behaviour of persons in a parking lot, where any of such persons is 
supposed to put in the parking meter just as many dimes as it needs (hence, not 
necessarily all of her dimes); moreover, we intuitively judge that an assumption 
like this is relevant to the ∃-reading of (5). I suggest that, as in the preceding 
cases we were able to account for the unexpected readings by allowing speakers’ 
presuppositions relevant to the subject-matter to interact with grammatical 
structure, so one should be able to explain away (5)’s ∃-reading by giving a 
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suitable implementation at LF of the presupposition referred to above. It is 
indeed straightforward to provide such an implementation: given that in the 
restrictive part of the main quantifier x is fixed to be a person and y a dime 
owned by x, the presupposition may be integrated by supposing that x did not use 
any quantity of other dimes (each different from dime y) which were adequate for 
the purpose. In order to give a logical translation of the relevant verbal structure, 
one needs two ingredients: a) a notation for representing quantities of objects 
(predicates and variables over i-sums), b) a unary predicate applying to i-sums, 
which should express a general condition of pragmatic adequacy to whatever 
relevant purpose. I provide here the required notation: 
(a) {Σi}i∈N is a set of variables for i-sums 
(b) the binary predicate constant ‘Π’ denotes the atomic-part relation: 
‘Π(x,Σ)’ means that the individual x is an atomic part of the i-sum Σ 
(c) the unary operator ‘*’ is prefixed to a distributive n-ary predicate over 
individuals, giving an n-ary predicate with one place for i-sums 
(d) the interpretation of a formula ‘*R(..,Σ,..)’ is fixed by the formula 
‘∀x[Π(x,Σ)→R(..,x,..)]’ 
(e) the unary predicate constant ‘Ω’ denotes a context-sensitive property: with 
respect to a context  c, ‘Ω(Σ)’ means that Σ is large enough for a c-salient 
purpose 
In virtue of (a)-(e), we are in a position to construe an LF for the explicitly 
restricted version (5°): 
(5°) Every person who had [a dime]i and did not put [any sufficient quantity 
of [other]i dimes] j in the parking meter put [it]i in the parking meter. 
(5°LF)  person(x) 
EVERY∀x Ey d(y) ; h(x,y) {p(x,y)} 
  ∀Σ((*d(Σ);*h(x,Σ);Ω(Σ);¬Π(y,Σ))⇒¬*p(x,Σ)) 
As for the previous QDR-based analyses, I propose to consider (5°LF) as a 
possible semantic representation of sentence (5), modulo QDR; I do so in virtue 
of its pragmatic equivalence to the immediate representation (5LF). 
The treatment proposed for sentence (5) can be generalized to the previous 
cases, where a uniqueness implicature was said to be present. The extension can 
be made by specifying an algorithmic procedure of QDR. The two algorithms 
given below provide a formalization of the accommodation processes which I 
take to be responsible for the apparent reading-shifts6. 
                                                 
6 I recall that I assume LFs with domain variables for quantified sentences; domain variables 
occupy a position in the restriction of quantifiers, and have the form f(x) – where ‘f’ and ‘x’ have 
semantic type <e,<e,t>> and e, respectively –. 
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Q∀ x {φ(x);Eyi ψ(x,yi);f(yj)(x)}{χ(x,y)}  ⇒RES∀ 
 φ(x) 
⇒RES∀  Q∀ x Ey ψ(x,y) {χ(x,y)}
 ∀Σ((*ψ(x,Σ); Ω(Σ);¬Π(y,Σ))→¬*χ(x,Σ)) 
Q∃ x {φ(x);Eyi ψ(x,yi);f(yj)(x)}{χ(x,y)}  ⇒RES∃ 
 φ(x) 
⇒RES∃  Q∃ x Ey ψ(x,y) {χ(x,y)} 
 ∀Σ((*ψ(x,Σ); Ω(Σ);¬Π(y,Σ))→*χ(x,Σ)) 
RES∀ and RES∃ describe a structural procedure for evaluating the function 
variable ‘f’ in the quantifier domain variable ‘f(yj)’; moreover, both algorithms 
sanction the binding of the individual variable ‘yj’ to the quantifier ‘Eyi’, thus 
imposing the further condition i=j. More precisely, the derivations given above 
go through if we assume the following conditions: 
 λy.λx.∀Σ((*ψ(x,Σ); Ω(Σ);¬Π(y,Σ))→¬*χ(x,Σ))  
 if the sentence is of the form Q∀ x Φ Ψ 
(a) [[f]] cg  = 
 λy.λx.∀Σ((*ψ(x,Σ); Ω(Σ);¬Π(y,Σ))→*χ(x,Σ))  
 if the sentence is of the form Q∃ x Φ Ψ 
(b)  i=j 
I intend the two algorithms to describe a procedure of QDR which is 
contextual in nature, though it happens to be expressible in a form under which 
the covert restrictive predicates are reconstructed in a syntax-driven fashion. The 
algorithmic expression of the two processes mustn’t make one think that all 
happens there within the realm of syntax, so to speak. The main factor calling for 
restrictions of this special kind resides typically in the structure of utterance-
contexts. The fact that I recognize the restrictions at issue to have a contextual 
character, and in particular to depend on the existence of certain presuppositions, 
while describing at the same time a uniform procedure which happens to be 
sensitive to grammatical structure, should not be regarded as denoting 
incoherence: as I have shown with my sample-analyses, it is a matter of fact that 
the presupposition π charged with the apparent reading-shift of the sentence α 
bears such a relation to α’s subject-matter, that it can be expressed under a form 
recoverable from α’s linguistic structure; this fact concerning formal 
expressibility of π explains how accommodation of π can be represented in the 
final analysis via expansion of the quantifier restriction according to a syntactic 
algorithm. 
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Appendix 
I provide here a sample-derivation of (5°LF) as semantic representation of (5) 
with respect to a context satisfying the presupposition (π). The derivation is 
intended to show that there is no necessary contrast between the idea that 
accommodation of a contextually supplied assumption occurs and the idea that 
the resulting restriction can be equated to the output of a syntactic algorithm.  
(5) Every person who had a dime put it in the parking meter. 
(5LF) EVERY∀ x {person(x) ; Eydime(y) ; have(x,y)} {put'(x,y)} 
(π) Every person who has a dime put in the parking meter just as many of her 
dimes as it needs. 
(πLF) ∀x{[p(x) ; Ey d(y) ; h(x,y)] ⇒ Ey[d(y) ; h(x,y) ; ∀Σ((*d(Σ) ; *h(x,Σ) ; 
Ω(Σ) ; ¬Π(y,Σ)) ⇒ ¬*put'(x,Σ))]} 
(5LF′) person(x) 
EVERY∀ x Ey dime(y) ; have(x,y) {put'(x,y)} 
 (πLF) 
(5LF″) person(x) 
EVERY∀ x Ey dime(y) ; have(x,y) {put'(x,y)} 
 Ey[d(y) ; h(x,y) ; ∀Σ((*d(Σ) ; *h(x,Σ) ; 
 Ω(Σ) ; ¬Π(y,Σ)) ⇒ ¬*put'(x,Σ))] 
(5°LF)  person(x) 
EVERY∀x Ey dime(y) ; have(x,y) {put'(x,y)} 
  ∀Σ((*d(Σ);*h(x,Σ);Ω(Σ);¬Π(y,Σ))⇒¬*p'(x,Σ)) 
 
 
References 
Barker, C.: 1996, “Presuppositions for Proportional Quantifiers”, in Natural Language Semantics 4, 
237-259. 
Chierchia, G.: 1995, Dynamics of Meaning: Anaphora, Presupposition, and the Theory of 
Grammar, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Groenendijk, J. and Stokhof, M.: 1991, “Dynamic Predicate Logic”, in Linguistics and Philosophy 
14, 39-100. 
Heim, I.: 1990, “E-type Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora”,  in Linguistics and Philosophy  13,  137-
177 
Kamp, H.: 1981, “A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation”, in J. Groenendijk, T.M.V. 
Janssen, M. Stokhof (eds.), Formal Methods in the Study of Language, Foris, Dordrecht. 
Kanazawa, M.: 1993, “Dynamic Generalized Quantifiers and Monotonicity”, in M. Kanazawa and 
C. J. Piñón (eds.), Dynamics, Polarity and Quantification, Center for the Study of Language 
and Information, Stanford, California. 
Kanazawa, M.: 1994, “Weak vs. Strong Readings of Donkey Sentences and Monotonicity 
Inference in a Dynamic Setting”, in Linguistics and Philosophy 17, 109-158. 
 12
Lappin, S. and Francez, N.: 1994, “E-type Pronouns, I-sums, and Donkey Anaphora”, in 
Linguistics and Philosophy 17, 391-428. 
Neale, S.: 1990, Descriptions, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Stanley, J. and Szabó, Z. G.: 2000, “On Quantifier Domain Restriction”, in Mind and Language 15, 
219-261. 
 13
